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DISMANTLING POLICING FOR PROFIT:




This Note argues that legal reforms enacted after the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri
uprising are insufficient to address the problem of using courts as revenue generators and
the related problem of predatory policing. Reforms to date have merely capped how much
money towns can raise from their courts; they have not fixed the perverse incentive
problem, which allows towns like Ferguson to extract wealth from vulnerable, low-
income residents through the court system. This Note argues that towns should be
required to remit the money their courts raise to a state education fund, which puts legal
separation between the entity collecting the money and the beneficiary of those funds.
This Note considers two provisions of the Missouri Constitution, one which could be read
as requiring such a reform, and another which could be read as prohibiting such a reform.
This Note compares Missouri’s constitutional provisions to a similar North Carolina
constitutional provision and concludes that the Missouri Constitution provides ample
support for reformers to advocate for this Note’s proposed reform. Finally, this Note offers
a roadmap for the steps needed to build political and legal support for the reform.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION....................................................................... 954
I. THE PROBLEM WITH POLICING FOR PROFIT .......................... 956
A. Municipalities in St. Louis Generate an Excessive Amount of 
Revenue from Their Courts, Which Has a Disparate Impact on
Black and Indigent People ........................................... 956
B. The Excessive Number of Municipal Jurisdictions Compounds 
For-Profit Policing Via the “Muni Shuffle” ........................ 959
C. Today’s For-Profit Policing Is Directly Related to the History of 
Residential Segregation in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area ..... 962
II. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORMS TO DATE ................... 966
∗ J.D. 2021, University of Michigan Law School, B.A. 2017, Brown University. I want to thank 
my parents, who have supported me and my education at every step. I also want to thank my Notes 
Editor Matthew Catallo and every editor at the Journal of Law Reform who worked on this Note along 
the way.
954 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:4
A. Existing Scholarship on Missouri Municipal Courts Calls for
Court Reform, but Proposals to Change Perverse Incentive 
Structures Are Under-Developed.................................... 966
B. Reforms Enacted Since Ferguson Have Improved the Status 
Quo but Are Not Sufficient to Eliminate Policing for Profit...... 968
1. Overview of the Enacted Reforms ............................ 968
2.  Assessing the Impact of Existing Reforms................. 971
III. A LEGAL MEANS TO END THE PERVERSE  INCENTIVE PROBLEM... 973
A. Are Municipal Ordinance Violations of “Penal Laws of the State” 
Whose Proceeds Must be Remitted?................................. 975
B. In Which Circumstances Does Article V, Section 27(16) Apply? .. 981
IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE .............................................. 985
CONCLUSION.......................................................................... 986
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the killing of Michael Brown, a Black teenager, by a white
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri sparked an uprising that garnered
international attention.1 Mr. Brown’s death was the catalyst, but historic
segregation and racial inequality in Ferguson and the surrounding re-
gion fueled the movement.2 The unrest caught the attention of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, which declined to bring charges against the of-
ficer who killed Michael Brown, but, in an exhaustive and highly conse-
quential investigation, found that “the combination of Ferguson’s focus
on generating revenue over public safety, along with racial bias, has a
profound effect on the [Ferguson Police Department]’s police and court
practices, resulting in conduct that routinely violates the Constitution
and federal law.”3 The events in Ferguson gave rise to the Black Lives
1. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan, Ford Fessenden, K. K. Rebecca Lai, Haeyoun Park, Alicia Par-
lapiano, Archie Tse, Tim Wallace, Derek Watkins & Karen Yourish, What Happened in Ferguson?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-
under-siege-after-police-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/5NEK-CN2E]; Adam Taylor & Rick Noack,
How the Rest of the World Sees Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:47 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/18/how-the-rest-of-the-world-sees-ferguson/ [https://
perma.cc/QA3Q-5LH8].
2. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE
ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), https://www.epi.org/publication/making-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/
U2AA-RXPR].
3. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Findings of Two Civil
Rights Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-announces-findings-two-civil-rights-investigations-ferguson-missouri [https://perma.cc/
QKZ2-ULQR].
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Matter movement, and a new generation of civil rights activists focused
on ending police brutality around the nation.4
Police brutality is not the only problem plaguing the region. The large
number of towns each trying to raise money through fees and fines has
cultivated a practice known as the “muni shuffle” in which people who
make bond in one town after being jailed for failure to pay tickets are
shuffled to the next town where they owe money.5 That is how Keilee
Fant, 37, ended up in the custody of five different towns after being ar-
rested while dropping off her kids at school, and how Edward Brown, 62,
was jailed for not paying fines on offenses such as failing to cut his grass.6
Although litigation, legislation, rulemaking, and other efforts have
targeted these issues, using police and courts to generate municipal rev-
enues through exploitative fees and fines, collectively referred to as “po-
licing for profit,” remains a serious problem in the St. Louis area and
throughout the country. In the wake of the Ferguson uprising, Missouri
enacted legislative and judicial reforms that lowered the cap on the per-
centage of revenue that towns may derive from their courts, instated
mandatory ability-to-pay hearings, made it easier for the public to sanc-
tion towns that violate the rules, and attempted to curtail debtors pris-
ons.7 However, these reforms have not fundamentally altered the per-
verse incentive structure that encourages towns to treat their police and
courts as revenue generators.
In this Note, I argue that the most effective way to fix the problem is
to require towns to give the proceeds from fines that their courts collect
to a different public interest entity: a state education fund. Such a change
would create legal and economic separation between the entity doing the
revenue collection and the entity benefiting from the funds. The Mis-
souri Constitution speaks to that issue in seemingly contradictory ways. 
This Note examines whether such a remittance is in fact already required
by the constitution, or at least permitted by it, and offers a blueprint for
how advocates can argue for and defend such a reform in the courts and
the legislature. This Note also explores ways for advocates to leverage ex-
isting reforms to achieve this long-term goal, including running ballot-
petition campaigns to disincorporate the worst offending towns (which
would revoke the charters that authorize them to operate), making
4. See Shannon Luibrand, How a Death in Ferguson Sparked a Movement in America, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 7, 2015, 5:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-the-black-lives-matter-movement-
changed-america-one-year-later/ [https://perma.cc/4Z3W-ZE65].
5. See discussion infra Part I.B.
6. Complaint ¶¶ 54–56, 79–81, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, 15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
8, 2015), ECF No. 1, https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-MO-0006-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJS2-3JRJ].
7. See S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); S.B. 572, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2016); MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.65, discussed infra Part II.B.
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examples of these towns, and building momentum for broader city-
county consolidation.
Part I explains the policing for profit problem, including the histori-
cal factors that created an environment of splintered, segregated govern-
ance in the region, which allowed predatory law enforcement to fester.
Part I also quantifies the profits that courts are collecting and discusses
how people experience government in the region today. Part II surveys
the reforms that were proposed after the Ferguson uprising, discusses
the reforms that were enacted, and evaluates where enacted reforms fell
short. Part III offers an in-depth legal analysis of two contrasting provi-
sions of the Missouri Constitution––one that could be read to require
towns to give up the money their courts collect and another that could be
read to prevent that outcome. Drawing on Missouri legal history as well
as caselaw from another jurisdiction with similar constitutional provi-
sions, Part III outlines the argument that the Missouri Constitution can
and should be read to require towns to remit fine collections to a public
education fund, and that the legislature could effect this change statuto-
rily. Part IV recaps how existing law can be better utilized to target the
worst-offending towns and build political momentum for broader
change.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH POLICING FOR PROFIT
In the years leading up to the Ferguson uprising, the policing for
profit problem was severe and bound up in a web of policies that pre-
vented people from escaping cycles of debt and incarceration. Historical
residential segregation created an environment and governmental
structures that enabled those policies. Part I quantifies the problem and
explores its roots.
A. Municipalities in St. Louis Generate an Excessive Amount of Revenue from
Their Courts, Which Has a Disparate Impact on Black and Indigent People
The municipal court system in the city and county of St. Louis ex-
tracts wealth from poor residents and maintains racialized social con-
trol. Police in numerous neighboring districts overzealously issue tickets
for minor infractions and courts levy steep monetary penalties for those
infractions as well as issue arrest warrants for people who fail to show up
SUMMER 2021] Dismantling Policing for Profit 957
to court or to pay.8 For example, in December of 2014, in a town of
roughly 21,000 people, the Ferguson municipal court had over 16,000
outstanding warrants on 32,975 offenses, of which 9,007 were in fiscal
year 2013 alone.9 The most common offenses leading to a warrant (be-
cause they were both frequently charged and the most likely to result in
missed court payments or appearances) were driving with a suspended
license, expired license plates, failure to register a vehicle, no proof of
insurance, and speeding.10 While Black people were 67% of the town’s
population, they accounted for 85% of traffic stops, 90% of citations, and
most grotesquely, 96% of known arrests made exclusively because of mu-
nicipal warrants.11
These stops have been a major source of revenue for the City. In 2015,
Ferguson expected to collect $3.09 million in revenue from fines and fees,
representing 23% of the City’s total budget of $13.26 million.12 That was
up from $2.63 million in fines and fees budgeted in 2014, and $2.11 mil-
lion budgeted in 2013 (the City actually collected $2.46 million that year).13
Ferguson was not even the worst offender in St. Louis County. In 2014,
St. Ann township (population 13,020) derived a whopping 39.6% of its
general revenue from fines and fees ($3.61 million in fee revenues on a
$9.12 million budget), and St. John township (population 6,517) was not
far behind at 29.4% ($1.13 million in fees on a $3.84 million budget).14
These data offer a local snapshot of a statewide phenomenon.
Today, fees and fines remain a major revenue source for municipal-
ities in Missouri, although the numbers have declined in recent years, 
possibly due to recently implemented reforms. Data from the Missouri
Judiciary’s Annual Statistical report show that in 2014, municipal divi-
sion courts reported a total of $109.66 million in fine collections
statewide and $12.47 million in fees and costs.15 In 2015, in response to
the Ferguson uprising, the Missouri legislature passed Senate Bill 5 (S.B. 
5) which imposed a cap on the percentage of revenue that a town can
8. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 3 (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_
police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5RU-H5UK] [hereinafter DOJ REPORT].
9. Id. at 6, 55.
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id. at 62–63.
12. Id. at 10.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Mike Maciag, Skyrocketing Court Fines Are Major Revenue Generator for Ferguson, GOVERNING
(Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/gov-ferguson-missouri-
court-fines-budget.html [https://perma.cc/N8KE-GUF4].
15. MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, TABLE 94, MUNICIPAL NET
DISBURSEMENTS/COLLECTIONS (2014), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=83262 [https://perma.cc/
G6XL-7F93].
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derive from its court.16 A year later 2016, municipal division fine and fee
revenues fell to $78.69 million and $8.43 million, respectively.17 In 2018,
it was $60.53 million and $6.52 million,18 and by 2020, it had fallen fur-
ther, to $48.38 million and $5.25 million.19 Independent analysis of the
2018 data found that, of towns reporting at least $100,000 in fee and fine
revenues, 18 municipalities in Missouri exceeded 10% of their operating
revenue from fees and fines, 6 exceeded the statutory cap of 20%, and 2
exceeded 30%.20 Nationally, there were 600 towns with more than
$100,000 in fee and fine revenues that derived more than 10% of their
total revenue from this source, with 284 exceeding 20%.21 While this Note
focuses on Missouri as an example, other states are also overly-reliant
on fees and fines and experience adverse consequences. For example, re-
cent research has revealed excessive and inefficient fines in counties in
Florida, New Mexico, and Texas. 22
Although court revenues are declining, existing revenues are not
evenly distributed across the population. Data from the state court ad-
ministrative office of aggregate fee and fine revenues and traffic case fil-
ings do not include demographic information,23 but police departments
in the state are required to disaggregate traffic stops by race. According
to the Missouri Attorney General, in 2018, “Blacks represent 10.9% of
Missouri’s driving-age population but 19.2% of all vehicle stops, for a dis-
parity index of 1.76. This means that Blacks were stopped at a rate 76%
greater than expected based upon their portion of the population sixteen
16. S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015).
17. MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2016, TABLE 94, MUNICIPAL NET
DISBURSEMENTS/COLLECTIONS (2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=109581 [https://perma.cc/
CV3Q-ABFX].
18. MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2018, TABLE 94, MUNICIPAL
NET DISBURSEMENTS/COLLECTIONS (2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=137389 [https://
perma.cc/4X2V-F5ZY] [hereinafter 2018 MO. JUD. REP. SUPPLEMENT].
19. MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2020, TABLE 94, MUNICIPAL
NET DISBURSEMENTS/COLLECTIONS (2020), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=177532 [hereinaf-
ter 2020 MO. JUD. REP. SUPPLEMENT].
20. Local Government Fine Revenues by State, GOVERNING, https://www.governing.com/gov-data/
other/local-governments-high-fine-revenues-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/9TR4-YHXE] (last visited
Nov. 9, 2019).
21. Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: Small Towns in Much of the Country Are Dangerously Dependent
on Punitive Fees and Fines, GOVERNING (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/
fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html [https://perma.cc/JXT8-957W].
22. Matthew Menendez, Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Noah Atchison & Michael Crowley, The Steep Costs
of Criminal Justice Fees and Fines, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.brennan-
center.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-criminal-justice-fees-and-fines [https://perma.cc/
K3LS-T75C].
23. See, e.g., 2020 MO. JUD. REP. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 19; MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL
REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2020, TABLE 93, MUNICIPAL CASES FILED, DISPOSED, AND PENDING
(2020) https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=177530.
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and older.”24 Likewise, the individuals charged fines and fees are likely to
be low-income, particularly because offenses like not having valid vehicle
insurance or registration stickers are crimes of poverty.25 The burden of
fees and fines falls heaviest on low-income people.26 A study of 500 ran-
domly-selected individuals charged with a felony in Washington State in
2004 found that, by 2008, median legal financial obligations compared
to expected earnings was 60% for white men, 36% for Hispanic men, and
50% for Black men; average legal debts compared to income were much
higher, reaching an astounding 222% for Black men.27 Because fees and
fines extract wealth from people who have the least, the authors aptly ti-
tled their study “Drawing Blood from Stones.”28
B. The Excessive Number of Municipal Jurisdictions Compounds For-Profit
Policing Via the “Muni Shuffle”
The St. Louis region today is filled with tiny jurisdictions each with
their own police forces, creating a landscape of duplicative policing and
little public accountability.29 St. Louis County, Missouri, is composed of
eighty-eight municipalities, not including the City of St. Louis.30 Some of
24. ERIC SCHMITT, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT: MISSOURI VEHICLE STOPS – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8
(2018), https://ago.mo.gov/docs/default-source/public-safety/2018vehiclestops-executivesum-
mary.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/J2BM-DACU].
25. The criminalization of poverty is an umbrella term describing policing and prosecuting prac-
tices that target poor people, often for minor public order offenses or for failure to have the resources to
comply with rules and regulations. See generally, Jessica Brand, How Fees and Fines Criminalize Poverty: Ex-
plained, APPEAL (July 28, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/how-fines-and-fees-criminal-
ize-poverty-explained/ [https://perma.cc/G7VT-3AQF]; PETERB.EDELMAN,NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR:THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN AMERICA (2017).
26. See generally Menendez et al., supra note 22.
27. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and
Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1776 (2010).
28. Id. at 1753.
29. See Jesse Bogan, St. Louis County’s Municipal Courts Are Still Being Judged – And Some Are Still Fall-
ing Short, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/st-louis-county-s-municipal-courts-are-being-judged-and/article_7db02ecc-6644-5619-8f94-
602fbd56095f.html [https://perma.cc/7JFH-ZXHY] (“Municipal courts have long been divisions of cir-
cuit courts, but over decades of running things their own way, in their own communities, oversight fell
short.”).
30. Municipalities and Census Designated Places 2010, OPEN GOV’T, ST. LOUIS CNTY., MO. (July 2018)
https://data.stlouisco.com/datasets/municipalities-and-census-designated-places/geoservice
[https://perma.cc/8HLX-BUSY]. While it is impossible to quantify what the “correct” number of ju-
risdictions in a metropolitan area is, the fractured St. Louis model stands in contrast to other metro
areas where city and county government have merged. See Anders Walker, House to House: Mergers,
Annexations & the Racial Implications of City-County Politics in St. Louis, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 127,
135–37 (2014) (discussing applicability of the Miami-Dade and Indianapolis-Marion models to St.
Louis).
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these municipalities have minuscule populations or land areas. For ex-
ample, the village of Champ has a population of thirteen (as of 2019), and
Glen Echo Park has a land mass of 0.032 square miles.31 Edmundson,
population 800, has a police force of 11 officers, and in 2014, the mayor
sent a letter to the officers reminding them that “the tickets that you
write do add to the revenue on which the P.D. budget is established and
will directly affect pay adjustments at budget time.”32 The perverse in-
centive of revenue collection combined with the fragmentation of gov-
ernment allows neighboring jurisdictions to target the same individuals,
trapping them in a web of legal and financial obligations. This is known
locally as the “muni shuffle.”33
To understand how the muni shuffle works, consider these real-
world examples from debtors prison litigation filed by the St. Louis-
based indigent defense organization ArchCity Defenders against the
City of Jennings34 for practices the organization described as “Dicken-
sian.”35 In 2014, Jennings issued 2.1 warrants per household, or 1.4 war-
rants for every adult in the city.36 When defendants failed to pay, Jennings
locked them in a squalid “jail,” without any inquiry into their ability to
pay or access to counsel.37 The conditions inside the jail were barbaric:
cells were overcrowded and at times covered in mucus, blood, and feces, 
creating an unbearable stench; inmates were subject to rampant physical
abuse; and inmates lacked access to adequate food, medication, and
basic hygienic products, such as toothbrushes and soap.38 Some inmates
even committed suicide while in custody.39
The Jennings plaintiffs were caught up in the muni shuffle. Edward
Brown, sixty-two, was homeless and squatting without heat or water. 
His only source of income was Social Security Disability benefits, and he
31. See Quick Facts, Champ Village, Missouri), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.cen-
sus.gov/search-results.html?searchType=web&cssp=SERP&q=Champ%20village,%20MO [https://
perma.cc/DG65-N7LL] (last visited May 17, 2021); U.S. Gazetteer Files, 2020, Places, Missouri, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/geo/docs/maps-data/data/gazetteer/2020_Gazetteer/2020_
gaz_place_29.txt [https://perma.cc/GZ5F-UD8Y] (last visited May 17, 2021).
32. Teresa Mathew, St. Louis County Is Profiting off the ‘Muni Shuffle’ Long After Ferguson Protests,
APPEAL (Jan. 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/st-louis-county-fines-and-fees-ferguson/ [https://
perma.cc/DH9J-7DSY].
33. Id.
34. Jennings has a population of 14,575 people, of whom 87.7% are Black, as of July 1, 2019. Quick
Facts, Jennings City, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
jenningscitymissouri [https://perma.cc/HD9E-ZYKA].
35. Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 8.
36. Id. ¶ 6.
37. Id. ¶ 1.
38. Id. ¶ 2.
39. Id. ¶ 3.
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relied on food stamps.40 He was issued tickets by Jennings for home oc-
cupancy violations (including not cutting the grass), allowing his girl-
friend to sleep over without an occupancy permit, ordinance violations
related to his pet dog, and trespassing.41 In 2010, he was jailed for two
weeks without access to counsel for failure to pay hundreds of dollars in
fines, and when he managed to scrounge together money for a reduced
$100 fine, he was not released, but rather, transferred to another jail in
the City of Pine Lawn for failure to pay tickets there.42
When locals refer to the “muni shuffle,” they are talking about shuf-
fling poor defendants between the multiple jurisdictions where they owe
money. In Mr. Brown’s case, this series of events repeated itself multiple
times annually from 2011 to 2014, with Mr. Brown being jailed again in
both Jennings and Pine Lawn, which took a severe toll on his health.43
Another individual, thirty-seven year old Keilee Fant, was arrested while
taking her kids to school in October 2013 for failure to pay tickets in Jen-
nings.44 When she pulled together enough money to pay Jennings, she
was “released” to the custody of the City of Bellefonte Neighbors, which
is so small that it contracted with Jennings to hold her in the Jennings
jail.45 When she paid off Bellefonte Neighbors, she was “released” to the
custody of Velda City, which contracted with the City of St. Louis to hold
her.46 After that, she was held for failure to pay tickets in two more towns:
the City of Normandy and the City of Beverly Hills.47
Egregious debtors’ prison practices like these have abated thanks to
both litigation by ArchCity,48 which has targeted specific towns and
scared others into reforms, and recent rulemaking by the Missouri Su-
preme Court, which formally bars incarceration without a municipal
court’s consideration of one’s ability to pay.49 However, the phenomenon
40. Id. ¶¶ 53–54.
41. Id. ¶ 55.
42. Id. ¶ 56.
43. Id. ¶¶ 57–71.
44. Id. ¶¶ 78–79.
45. Id. ¶ 81.
46. Id. ¶ 81.
47. Id. ¶ 81.
48. See generally Settlement Agreement, Jenkins v. City of Jennings, 15-CV-00252,  (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 12, 2016), ECF No. 35-1, https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/CJ-MO-0006-0005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Q3A-U628] (agreeing to settle the dispute between ArchCity and the City of Jen-
nings).
49. MO. S. CT. R. 37.65(f) (“A judge may not incarcerate the defendant for nonpayment of a fine,
fee, or cost unless the judge holds a hearing, with adequate notice to the defendant, and makes one
of the following written findings: (1) The failure to pay was not due to an inability to pay but was
willful or due to a failure to make bona fide efforts to pay; or (2) The failure to pay was not the fault
of the defendant and alternatives to incarceration are not adequate in the circumstances of the case
to meet the municipality’s or county’s interest in punishment and deterrence.”).
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of St. Louis residents racking up tickets in several jurisdictions at once is
far from over.
C. Today’s For-Profit Policing Is Directly Related to the History of Residential
Segregation in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area
Because the “muni shuffle,” described above, is made possible by the
multiplicity of municipal jurisdictions in the region, attacking the prob-
lem requires some understanding of how those jurisdictions came about
and what role racial segregation played in that process.
The City of St. Louis split from St. Louis County in 1876, in part due
to a desire for greater local autonomy.50 In the years leading up to and
following the Civil War, city residents grew weary of state and county ef-
forts to, as city residents saw it, exploit the city’s wealth.51 The state was
micromanaging local affairs, and the city residents were paying the
county for duplicative services.52 The new state constitution of 1875 re-
flected residents’ desire for greater autonomy, explicitly providing for
the city’s independence from the county.53 Another motivating factor
was a continuing power struggle among pro-Union Radicals who domi-
nated the constitutional convention.54 During the convention, the Radi-
cals succeeded in purging non-Radicals from state government, includ-
ing in St. Louis County, but they did not succeed in ousting from the city
confederate-sympathizing conservatives, who made the city “‘the center
of opposition’ to Radical rule.”55
The city continued to grow, but the terms of the city-county separa-
tion agreement and the 1875 constitution fixed the city boundaries, sub-
ject to the approval of a board of freeholders and a popular vote.56 Be-
cause of the difficulty of expanding the city, development occurred
outside the city boundaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, when the Black population began to rise.57 Although the 1875
constitution gave the City of St. Louis the exclusive right to establish a
charter form of self-government, the state later allowed all townships of
50. MO. CONST. art. IX, §§ 20, 23 (1875). See Colin Gordon, Patchwork Metropolis: Fragmented Gov-
ernance and Urban Decline in Greater St. Louis, 34 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2014).
51. Peter W. Salsich, Jr. & Samantha Caluori, Can St. Louis City and County Get Back Together?
(Do Municipal Boundaries Matter Today?), 34 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 13, 19 (2014).
52. Gordon, supra note 50, at 52.
53. Salsich & Caluori, supra note 51, at 15–16; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 23 (1875).
54. Walker, supra note 30, at 130.
55. Id.
56. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 20 (1875); Gordon, supra note 50, at 53.
57. Gordon, supra note 50, at 53–54.
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more than 5,000 people to enact a charter.58 This made Missouri one of
the first states to guarantee “home rule” in its constitution.59
Owing to these incentives, efforts to reunify the city and county re-
peatedly failed. Reformers mounted efforts to do so in 1926, 1930, 1954,
1955, 1959, 1962, and 1984, none of which succeeded.60 These failures oc-
curred even as other major U.S. metropolitan areas consolidated their
governments in the second half of the twentieth century.61 Nonetheless,
in 1966, article VI, section 30 of the Missouri Constitution was adopted, 
allowing for the reunification of the city and county through a complex
process by which voters petition for the appointment of a board of free-
holders to propose changes which must then be approved by both the city
and county.62 Most recently, an effort to place a question on the
statewide ballot about city-county reunification was abandoned in early
2019.63 The earlier efforts for city-county reunification did however plant
the seeds for greater regional cooperation and future unification. They
produced a number of regional authorities, including a sewer and com-
munity college district; regional zoos, parks, museums, and sporting
venues; and regional transportation, public safety, and economic devel-
opment entities.64
Because of failed efforts to reunify St. Louis, today’s street-level de-
cisions about policing and ordinance enforcement are made against a
backdrop of political and geographic segregation, which has resulted in
the racialized dispossession of wealth and property. This is not an acci-
dent. Until the 1948 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,
which held that private deed restrictions barring land from being sold to
people of a different race could not be enforced in court,65 racial cove-
nants were used to prevent Black people from leaving the city for the
58. Id. at 53; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 20 (1875); MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19–19(a). See also MO. CONST.
art. VI, § 17 (protecting the ability of towns to separate or consolidate).
59. Salsich & Caluori, supra note 51, at 15 n.12. “Home rule” is defined as “[a] state legislative
provision or action allocating a measure of autonomy to a local government, conditional on its ac-
ceptance of certain terms.” Home Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
60. See Walker, supra note 30, at 133.
61. E. Terrence Jones, Toward Regionalism: The St. Louis Approach, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
103, 110–11 (2014) (describing city-county consolidation occurring in Indianapolis, Jackson, and
Nashville).
62. Walker, supra note 30, at 134; MO. CONST. art. VI, § 30(a).
63. David Hunn, Better Together Pulls St. Louis City-County Merger Proposal, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 7, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/better-together-
pulls-st-louis-city-county-merger-proposal/article_c71a51d2-998b-5e95-9926-ad3707671690.html
[https://perma.cc/27DB-FGUC].
64. Id. at 112–14.
65. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
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county.66 After Shelley made racial covenants unenforceable, white su-
premacists used municipal incorporation to promote segregation.67 For
example, Kinloch, Missouri (which neighbors Ferguson) was the only
Black town in the county and was once a thriving center of Black cul-
ture.68 Then, in 1938, the City of Berkeley split off from Kinloch to avoid
sharing a school district.69 The acrimony between the towns was so se-
vere that, in the 1970s, Berkeley leaders wanted to build a wall dividing
the towns.70 In the 1980s, an adjacent airport began buying up land in
Kinloch for an expansion, pushing residents out.71 Today, Kinloch is a
wasteland of vacant lots, trash, and abandoned streets.72 The municipal-
ity is barely functional and risks literally “falling off the map.”73
This story is not unique within the St. Louis area. In 1969, when res-
idents of unincorporated St. Louis County sought to build a mixed-in-
come housing project, opponents quickly mobilized to incorporate the
City of Black Jack, which instituted restrictive zoning laws to block the
project.74 Black residents in the city sued, claiming that they were being
shut out of housing and job opportunities in the suburbs.75 The Nixon
66. See, e.g., Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline, St. Louis and the American City, U. IOWA LIBRS., 
http://mappingdecline.lib.uiowa.edu/map/ [https://perma.cc/9NGS-EB7L] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2021) (mapping racial covenants in the St. Louis region and racial residential patterns from the early
twentieth century through the present day).
67. See generally id. at Race & Property tab (“The history of greater St. Louis, is bound up in a
tangle of local, state, and federal policies that explicitly and decisively sorted the City’s growing pop-
ulation by race. These policies yielded both an intense concentration of African Americans in certain
wards or neighborhoods of St. Louis itself and a virtually unbreachable wall between the City and its
suburbs. The isolation of African Americans on St. Louis’ near northside was accomplished and en-
forced in a variety of ways; some private and public strategies of exclusion overlapped and reinforced
one another, others were cobbled together as legal challenges prohibited some of the more direct
tools of segregation.”).
68. Jeffrey Smith, You Can’t Understand Ferguson Without First Understanding These Things, NEW
REPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119106/ferguson-missouris-complicated-
history-poverty-and-racial-tension [https://perma.cc/9XYQ-Y2QK].
69. Id.
70. Mary Delach Leonard, Ferguson’s Yesterdays Offer Clues to the Troubled City of Today, ST. LOUIS PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 2, 2015, 11:27 PM), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/fergusons-yesterdays-offer-clues-
troubled-city-today#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U2YB-4BYM].





74. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182–83 (8th Cir. 1974). See also William
H. Freivogel, Supreme Court Housing Discrimination Decision Had Its Roots in Black Jack, ST. LOUIS PUB.
RADIO (June 25, 2015, 5:39 PM), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/supreme-court-housing-dis-
crimination-decision-had-its-roots-black-jack#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/6RF9-BZ3S].
75. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 125 (2017).
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administration intervened on the residents’ behalf, and the residents
won at the Court of Appeals, allowing the project to proceed.76 Most in-
famously, the City of St. Louis bulldozed twenty blocks of “slums” in 1952
to construct the massive, federally-funded Pruitt-Igoe public housing
complex, consisting of thirty-three buildings of eleven stories each.77
Igoe tower was intended to be white-only, while Pruitt was to be Black-
only, but Black people were allowed to buy into Igoe when no white buy-
ers could be found.78 Pruitt-Igoe was quickly plagued by crime. 79 As a
result, the city began imploding the buildings in 1972 in a watershed mo-
ment for U.S. urban development.80 Today, much of the complex re-
mains vacant and overgrown.81
This history is critical to understanding who wields political power
in the St. Louis region and how a system of dispossessing already des-
perately poor residents of wealth via predatory policing could persist to-
day. In short, it is no coincidence that St. Louis County is 25% Black and
68% white, the City of St. Louis is 46% Black and majority non-white,82
and both maintain complex legal systems that subjugate Black residents
and restrict their mobility. These systems are complimentary and mutu-
ally reinforcing; the Missouri Constitution makes it easy to create new
towns, racial animus inspired citizens to create at least some of these
towns, and the history of legalized racial segregation continues to shape
residential patterns today.83 White political leadership, even in majority
Black jurisdictions, has compounded these problems, reflecting dispari-
ties in political power.84 The next Section discusses the success and
76. Id.
77. See Tim O’Neil, 45 Years Ago: A Final Blow Is Dealt to Pruitt-Igoe, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 1,
2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/years-ago-a-final-blow-is-dealt-to-pruitt-igoe/ar-
ticle_e2a30e7c-f180-5770-8962-bf6e8902efc1.html#1 [https://perma.cc/H6Y9-P26W]. See generally Renew-
ing Inequality: Family Displacements Through Urban Renewal 1950-1966, St. Louis, MO, DIGIT. SCHOLARSHIP
LAB, UNIV. OF RICH. https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/renewal/#view=0/0/1&viz=cartogram&city=
saintlouisMO&loc=12/38.6178/-90.2353 [https://perma.cc/2FCD-A8J3] (last visited Apr. 17, 2021) (map-
ping urban renewal projects in St. Louis).
78. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 75, at 32.
79. Id. at 32.
80. Id. at 32.
81. Id. at 32; Michael R. Allen, Pruitt Igoe Now: Before and After Pruitt Igoe, http://www.pruittigoe-
now.org/before-and-after [https://perma.cc/GMY4-RM5Z] (last visited May 9, 2021).
82. Quick Facts, St. Louis City, Missouri., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.cen-
sus.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/stlouiscitymissouri,stlouiscountymissouri/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/
ML2K-HJD2].
83. See MO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 17, 19; United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1182–83
(8th Cir. 1974); Gordon, supra note 66.
84. At the time of the Ferguson uprising, the city, which is 67% Black, had a mayor who was a
white, Republican former police officer, and a council where six of seven members were white. See
Charles D. Ellison, Ferguson’s White City Leadership Must Change, ROOT (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:25 AM),
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shortcomings of efforts to address these issues and remedy past inequi-
ties.
II. EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORMS TO DATE
Since 2014, various studies have detailed the governmental failures
that contributed to the uprising in Ferguson, Missouri.85 These early ef-
forts translated into legislative action to cap how much revenue towns
can derive from their courts, as well as new court rules to create more
procedural safeguards for defendants in municipal courts.86 These steps
diminished court revenues87 but did not change who was collecting
them, allowing towns to continue operating police and court systems
that prioritize revenue collection. Thus, existing reforms are insufficient
to dismantle the system of wealth extraction from the poor, and more is
needed to achieve this goal.
A. Existing Scholarship on Missouri Municipal Courts Calls for Court Reform,
but Proposals to Change Perverse Incentive Structures Are Under-Developed
The outcry over Michael Brown’s killing and the protests that fol-
lowed created demand and political space for reform. The indigent de-
fense organization ArchCity Defenders quickly released its Municipal
Courts White Paper, which focused on the severe deficiencies of the mu-
nicipal courts where ArchCity attorneys had long practiced.88 After the
paper was published, then-Governor Jay Nixon convened a commission
to study the underlying causes of the uprising.89 The commission pro-
duced a comprehensive report, Forward Through Ferguson: A Path Toward
Racial Equality, which called for consolidation of both municipal courts
and police districts, and for a ban on municipal court judges practicing
https://www.theroot.com/ferguson-s-white-city-leadership-must-change-1790876753 [https://
perma.cc/E5BL-KEPV].
85. See, e.g., DOJ Report, supra note 8; see also discussion infra pp. 114–15.
86. See S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); see also MO. S. CT. R. 37.65.
87. See discussion infra pp. 105–06.
88. THOMAS HARVEY, JOHN MCANNAR, MICHAEL-JOHN VOSS, MEGAN CONN, SEAN JANDA &
SOPHIA KESKEY, ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER (Nov. 23, 2014),
https://www.archcitydefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ArchCity-Defenders-Municipal-
Courts-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VB53-N8HA].
89. The Commission, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON, https://forwardthroughferguson.org/re-
port/executive-summary/the-commission/ [https://perma.cc/UNH2-4F9Q] (last visited Apr. 12,
2021).
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in other municipal courts in the same county.90 Forward Through Ferguson
also called for municipal courts to end incarceration for non-violent of-
fenses, end failure to appear warrants, cancel outstanding warrants, im-
plement ability-to-pay hearings, and revoke some fines for inability to
pay.91
Around the same time, an organization known as Better Together St.
Louis issued the first of several reports in support of government consol-
idation in the city and county. At the invitation of Better Together, the
Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted an in-depth review
of the many police districts in St. Louis County and produced a report
calling for the regionalization of police services.92 PERF found that the
existing fragmented system was financially inefficient; produced de-
partments that varied widely in policies, training, and resources; and al-
lowed individual towns to treat their police forces as revenue genera-
tors.93 To resolve these issues, PERF proposed distributing existing
municipal police departments into three geographic “clusters” which
would all use standard training and CompStat data sharing.94
The Missouri Supreme Court convened its own Municipal Division
Working Group to issue recommendations for how it might use its su-
pervisory powers to reform the municipal division.95 Similar to the For-
ward Through Ferguson report, the Working Group called for curtailing ar-
rest warrants for failure to appear, including dismissal of old warrants, 
and for codifying protections against incarceration for inability to pay
court debts.96 It also recommended rules against municipal judges and
prosecuting attorneys practicing in other capacities in the same county.97
A majority of the Working Group concluded, however, that the Missouri
Supreme Court does not have the power to unilaterally consolidate mu-
nicipal courts on its own authority, because the court’s general supervi-
sory powers are qualified by the state constitution’s more specific provi-
sions creating circuit and municipal courts.98 Washington University
90. FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD RACIAL EQUITY 77–79,
85 (Oct. 14, 2015), https://3680or2khmk3bzkp33juiea1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/09/101415_FergusonCommissionReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DG2-9EHY].
91. Id. at 94.
92. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., OVERCOMING THE CHALLENGES AND CREATING A REGIONAL APPROACH
TO POLICING IN ST. LOUIS CITY AND COUNTY (2015), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/stlouis.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JK74-TASP].
93. Id. at 2–3.
94. Id. at 3–6.
95. See Municipal Court Reform, MO. CTS., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=129997
[https://perma.cc/R472-9FCH] (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
96. REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAL DIVISION WORK GROUP TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 5–7
(2016), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=98093 [https://perma.cc/NF7C-JT3A].
97. Id. at 1–2.
98. See id. at 69–72.
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Law Professor Kimberly Norwood dissented from this conclusion, writ-
ing that if the court has supervisory powers, it can make rules for the ef-
ficient administration of justice, which might include consolidation of
small and underperforming municipal courts.99
The Working Group Report also recommended that all funds from
ordinance violations be directed to the state education fund, just as
funds from violations of state penal law are sent there.100 The report
called this reform “the most sure way to thoroughly and forever eliminate
the perverse financial incentives affecting the municipal courts . . . .”101
It directed that recommendation to the state legislature without ad-
dressing whether the Missouri Constitution permits the legislature to
enact mandatory remittance of revenues from municipal courts to a state
education fund, or whether a constitutional amendment would be
needed to pass such a law.102 In dissent, Professor Norwood argued that
the Missouri Constitution already required such a remittance.103
B. Reforms Enacted Since Ferguson Have Improved the Status Quo but Are Not
Sufficient to Eliminate Policing for Profit
1. Overview of the Enacted Reforms
In response to the Ferguson uprising, Missouri enacted S.B. 5 and a
companion bill the following year, Senate Bill 572 (S.B. 572).104 Beginning
January 1, 2016, towns were prohibited from deriving more than 20% of
their general operating revenue from courts, down from 30% in the
amended “Macks Creek law.”105 Towns are required to report their
99. Id. app. A at 13–15.
100. Id. at 78–81.
101. Id. at 81.
102. See id.
103. Id. app. A at 17–18; see discussion infra pp. 121–22.
104. S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); S.B. 572, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2016); Missouri SB 5: Modifies Distribution of Traffic Fines and Court Costs Collected by Municipal Courts, FINES &
FEES JUST. CTR., https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/missouri-sb-5-fines-fees-municipal-courts/
[https://perma.cc/S4GV-KRKC] (last visited May 9, 2021).
105. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.359 (2016). The moniker “Macks Creek law” comes from the town the
law was first meant to target, Macks Creek, which was notorious for funding its operations by run-
ning a speed trap. John Rogers, When Ticket-Writing Stops, Speed Trap Goes Broke, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2,
1998, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-aug-02-mn-9388-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6GQ2-FYR2]. In 1998, three years after the law’s passage, the town filed for bank-
ruptcy. Id. The law originally set the cap at 45%. Id.; see City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d
183, 189 (Mo. 2017) (tracing the history of the Macks Creek law revenue cap, from 45% in 1995 down
to 30% in 2013), abrogated by City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764, 778 (Mo.
2019).
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compliance with the State Auditor.106 If the Director of Revenue certifies
that a town did not remit excess revenues above the cap to the state as
required, it must hold a disincorporation vote.107 S.B. 572 made town
consolidation easier by providing that residents could place a disincor-
poration vote on the ballot upon the petition of 25% of the town’s vot-
ers.108 Cumulatively, the laws contain provisions to curtail use of con-
finement to coerce payment of court debts, and to require courts to adopt
procedures to consider indigency and ability to pay when assessing
fines.109
Parts of S.B. 5 apply only to St. Louis County, because the policing
for profit problem was thought to be especially severe there, and those
provisions have been in legal limbo.110 The revenue cap was set at 12.5%, 
rather than 20%, in counties with more than 950,000 people.111 As of the
2010 Census, only one Missouri county meets that criterion—St. Louis
County.112 In 2017, the lower 12.5% cap was struck down in City of Nor-
mandy v. Greitens as an impermissible special law—a law that singles out
members of a class for differential treatment—as opposed to a law of
general applicability.113 However, the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the 12.5% cap was severable from the rest of that section of S.B. 5, which
also imposed the 20% cap.114 The Court applied the 20% cap to St. Louis
County, rather than reverting to the 30% cap that existed before S.B. 5, 
believing that the former better reflected legislative intent.115 Thus, for
most of S.B. 5’s lifespan, the 12.5% cap has been defunct. Additionally, 
S.B. 5 implemented enhanced minimum standards of data collection and
reporting for town budgets and police forces in St. Louis County, and
provided for a disincorporation vote for towns that did not follow those
standards.116 The City of Normandy decision also enjoined the enhanced
106. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.360 (2016).
107. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.368(3) (2016).
108. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 77.700(2), 80.570(2), 82.133(2) (2016).
109. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.353 (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 479.360 (2016).
110. See Benjamin Peters, Missouri Supreme Court Upholds Most Provisions of Municipal Court Reform
Law, MO. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://themissouritimes.com/missouri-supreme-court-upholds-
most-provisions-of-municipal-court-reform-law/ [https://perma.cc/6CX5-ZMP7] (quoting bill spon-
sor Eric Schmitt describing municipal courts before SB5 “especially in the St. Louis region” as “a safe
haven for overgrown local governments that treated citizens like ATMs rather than trimming their
budgets . . .”).
111. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. § 479.359.2 (2016).
112. Total Population, 2010 Decennial Census, Table P1, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=missouri%20county%20population&g=0400000US29.050000&tid=
DECENNIALSF12010.P1&tp=true&hidePreview=true [https://perma.cc/Z9DL-PP66].
113. City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183, 197, abrogated by City of Aurora v. Spectra
Commc’ns Grp., LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764, 778 (Mo. 2019).
114. Id. at 197.
115. See id. at n.19.
116. MO. REV. STAT. § 67.287 (2016).
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minimum standards for municipal courts that applied only in St. Louis
County.117
But recently, there has been a major doctrinal change. On December
24, 2019, the Missouri Supreme Court decided City of Aurora v. Spectra
Communications Group, LLC, in which the court abandoned its previous,
more demanding test for determining what constitutes an impermissi-
ble special law under the state constitution in favor of a rational basis
test.118 This decision abrogated the court’s application of the special law
doctrine in City of Normandy.119 On January 30, 2020, the Attorney General
of Missouri, Eric Schmitt, who was the sponsor of S.B. 5 when he was a
state senator, petitioned the Cole County Circuit Court to reinstate the
12.5% cap in S.B. 5.120 On December 1, 2020, the Cole County Circuit
Court granted the state’s motion and lifted the permanent injunctions on
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 67.287 and 479.359.2, the heightened standards and the
12.5% revenue cap that applied only in St. Louis County, finding that the
special treatment of St. Louis County was justified under City of Aurora’s
deferential rational basis review standard.121 As of this writing, an appeal
has been filed in this case.122 It remains to be seen what the impact of this
ruling will be.
Besides legislative change, the Missouri Supreme Court also up-
dated the rules that govern municipal courts. Rule 37.65, as amended ef-
fective January 1, 2019, provides that a municipal court must inquire
about a defendant’s ability to pay fees or fines if the defendant states that
they are unable to pay.123 If the defendant is unable to pay, or may be able
to pay later, the court may impose a payment plan, reduce or waive fines
or costs, or offer community service or court programs as alternatives, 
taking into account the defendant’s access to transportation, caregiving,
and employment responsibilities.124 The rule also requires the court to is-
sue a summons (rather than a warrant) if the defendant fails to appear
once and an arrest warrant only if the defendant fails to appear more
than once.125 The rule also curtails incarceration for failure to pay and
117. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d at 202 (enjoining application of MO. REV. STAT. § 67.287).
118. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., 592 S.W.3d at 780–81.
119. Id.
120. Press Release, Eric Schmitt, Mo. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Schmitt Argues Court Should
Allow Enforcement of Senate Bill 5 Provisions in St. Louis County (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.stlmuni.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Attorney-General-Eric-Schmitt-Reopens-
SB-5-Challenge.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QJC-8YCC].
121. City of Normandy v. Parson, No. 15AC-CC00531-01, ¶¶ 49–60 (Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1,
2020), appeal docketed, No. 15AC-CC00531-01 (Mo. Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.courts.mo.gov/fv/c/
Order+and+Judgment_FINAL.pdf?courtCode=19&di=1978790 [https://perma.cc/H3LM-A6UG].
122. Id.
123. MO. S. CT. R. 37.65(a).
124. MO. S. CT. R. 37.65(b)-(c).
125. MO. S. CT. R. 37.65(e).
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contempt of court, which may be used only where the defendant’s non-
payment was willful and not due to inability to pay, or where failure to
pay was not the defendant’s fault but “alternatives to incarceration are
not adequate in the circumstances of the case to meet the municipality’s
or county’s interest in punishment and deterrence.”126
2. Assessing the Impact of Existing Reforms
These changes are good, but they fall short in a number of ways. 
First, although the reforms constrain how much money towns can take
from their courts, they do not eliminate incentives for collecting fees and
fines; towns can still retain revenues from their courts as long as they fall
below the 20% cap. Second, the efficacy of these changes depends on ag-
gressive enforcement by state and local actors, which can be difficult, es-
pecially given the large number of small jurisdictions that need to be
monitored. Furthermore, although the Missouri Auditor has made
towns’ financial disclosures available online to improve accountability,
the majority of disclosures are available only as individual PDF files for
each town.127 Thus, the information in these disclosures is not easily
searchable, which limits its utility.
Activists should pressure the Auditor and other state actors, such as
the Director of Revenue and the Attorney General, to use their powers to
the fullest extent of the law. However, even well-intentioned state-level
officials may hesitate to act, as taking legal action against a town for vi-
olating S.B. 5 amounts to accusing local officials of running an exploita-
tive justice system, which presents political difficulties.128
Third, S.B. 5 is not stringent enough to change practices in many
towns. Of a sample of 146 towns that responded to a budget survey from
the Missouri Municipal League in fiscal year (FY) 2014, 7 had court reve-
nues above 20% of their budgets before the cap went into effect.129 That
number rose to 8 of 146 respondents in FY15, the year the cap was
126. MO. S. CT. R. 37.65(f)–(g).
127. See Financial Reports, OFF. OF THE MO. STATE AUDITOR, https://app.auditor.mo.gov/Local/
SearchPolysubFinancialReports.aspx [https://perma.cc/8C3M-CAT4] (last visited Oct. 24, 2020)
(providing a database searchable by county).
128. But see Press Release, Eric Schmitt, Mo. Att’y Gen., Missouri Attorney General’s Office Set-
tles Lawsuit with City of Marshfield over Alleged Ticket Quota (Aug. 27, 2020), https://ago.mo.gov/
home/news/2020/08/28/missouri-attorney-general-s-office-settles-lawsuit-with-city-of-marsh-
field-over-alleged-ticket-quota [https://perma.cc/EGQ5-W3L9] (announcing enforcement action by
the Attorney General against a non-compliant town).
129. Samuel Rubinstein, The Profit Motive and Courts: How Legislation in Missouri to Curb
Towns’ Reliance on Court Fine Revenues Changed Policing and Enforcement 96 (2017) (B.A. thesis,
Brown University) (on file with author). Note that town fiscal years may start on January 1st or mid-
way through the calendar year, making comparability difficult.
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enacted.130 In FY16, 2 towns of a sample of 161 still exceeded the cap.131 Of
those same samples, 6 towns were above 10% but below 20% in FY14, 5
were in that range in FY15, and 9 were in that range FY16.132 Moreover,
these survey responses were voluntary, meaning they may undercount
towns with greater dependency on fine revenues that chose not to self-
report.133 Regardless, these data suggest that the law has had the greatest
impact on outlier townships with the most abusive practices—assuming
the cap is actually enforced against towns that are non-compliant. Tar-
geting the worst offenders makes sense as a policy priority, but deriving
10 to 20% of a town’s budget from fines and fees, as opposed to taxes of
general applicability, is still significant.
Finally, these reforms have not done enough to change conditions on
the ground for municipal court defendants. In March 2019, this author
participated in court watching in St. Louis city and County with the in-
digent defense organization ArchCity Defenders.134 We observed that
municipal judges reduce the ability-to-pay inquiry Rule 37.65 demands
to merely asking whether the defendant can pay that day or needs a pay-
ment plan. We did not observe any judge asking a defendant for docu-
mentation of public assistance to determine their indigence. If the de-
fendant knew to ask for community service, the hours imposed could be
onerous, despite the requirement to consider the defendant’s other obli-
gations.
We observed not just bad policies, but implementation of those pol-
icies in a culture of disrespect. In the City of St. Louis, where we observed
at least thirty-two defendants, all of whom were Black, a judge insisted
that he would not order a payment plan of less than $50 a month, hardly
affordable for an indigent defendant, and repeatedly threatened defend-
ants who were behind on payments with arrest warrants.135 He candidly
told us after court that he needed to bluff to scare defendants into paying




133. See id. at 77. Other research suggests the problem was more widespread at the time. See,
e.g., Maciag, supra note 14 (finding three towns with fine revenue percentages over 20% and four
more towns above 10%, from a survey of just nineteen jurisdictions in St. Louis City and County
based on their 2013 financial reports). This underscores the need for the State Auditor to compile all
of the mandatory municipal financial disclosures in one searchable and comparable database.
134. These court visits included Ferguson Municipal Court (Mar. 4, 2019), St. Louis Municipal
Court (Mar. 5–6, 2019), Jennings Municipal Court (Mar. 5, 2019), Velda City Municipal Court (Mar.
6, 2019), Bel-Ridge Municipal Court (Mar. 6, 2019), Moline Acres Municipal Court (Mar. 6, 2019), and
Calverton Park Municipal Court (Mar. 6, 2019).
135. Observation at St. Louis Municipal Court (Mar. 5, 2019, 2:00 PM) (data analysis of court
watching forms by student volunteers).
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because he doubted it would ever be completed.136 In Jennings, we ob-
served at least forty-two defendants, of whom at least 89% were Black,
seated in rows of benches, until their row was called to stand in a line in
front of the judge.137 The judge scowled at one Black man for wearing a
do-rag in court, which he called disrespectful.138 He silenced defendants
who tried to speak to him unprompted and speedily imposed harsh mon-
etary penalties before repeating the process with the next person in
line.139
These anecdotes, combined with the shortcomings and statistics de-
scribed above, make it clear that future reforms must strike at the heart
of the justice for profit system to meaningfully change the conditions
that produced the Ferguson uprising, and that maintain racial- and
class-based social control in the St. Louis area today. Part III offers one
idea of how to do so.
III. A LEGAL MEANS TO END THE PERVERSE
INCENTIVE PROBLEM
Limiting the amount and types of fines and fees that can be imposed
is the best way to minimize the financial burden of fines and fees on res-
idents. To that end, the legislature should fund the courts with general
revenue rather than user fees, and it should reduce or eliminate fines
that are disproportionate to the offense they penalize—or eliminate the
offense altogether. To be sure, some fees and fines will persist, either be-
cause eliminating them is not politically feasible (e.g., replacing user fees
with taxes), because they are necessary for public safety (e.g., speeding
tickets), or because they are a less harmful alternative to incarceration
(e.g., driving on a suspended license). Thus, fundamentally changing the
incentive structure of fees and fines by removing the profit motive re-
quires a legal barrier between the entity collecting the funds and the en-
tity benefiting from the proceeds.
One readily-available way to do this would be to require towns to re-
mit revenue from fines to the state government. That policy is already
required by the Missouri Constitution for certain types of state fines, but
reformers need a legal theory that applies the constitution’s remittance
requirements to municipal governments. Does the Missouri Constitu-
tion as currently written permit required remittance from towns to the
state? Does it actually require such a remittance—and has that
136. Id.
137. Observation at City of Jennings Municipal Court (Mar. 5, 2019) (data analysis of court
watching forms by student volunteers).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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requirement long been ignored? Or does the Missouri Constitution pro-
hibit a municipal remittance requirement and enshrine local autonomy?
There are textual arguments for each of these propositions.
Dissenting from the Municipal Courts Working Group Report, Pro-
fessor Norwood argued that the Missouri Constitution requires such a re-
mittance but left other questions unanswered.140 Professor Norwood
identified two key provisions of the Missouri Constitution that are im-
plicated by this discussion: article IX, section 7 and article V, section
27(16). Article IX, section 7 mandates that “the clear proceeds of all pen-
alties, forfeitures, and fines collected hereafter for any breach of the pe-
nal laws of the state . . . shall be distributed annually to the schools of the
several counties according to law.”141 She argued that fines collected by
municipal courts are collected for breaches of state penal laws.142 Accord-
ing to Professor Norwood, the fines are penal because double jeopardy
attaches for fines in municipal courts,143 although that doesn’t fully ex-
plain how municipal ordinances are “penal laws of the state.”144 The sec-
ond clause, article V, section 27(16) states in part:
A municipal corporation with a population of under four hun-
dred thousand shall have the right to enforce its ordinances and
to conduct prosecutions before an associate circuit judge in the
absence of a municipal judge and in appellate courts under the
process authorized or provided by this article and shall receive
and retain any fines to which it may be entitled. All court costs
shall be paid to and deposited monthly in the state treasury.145
Of this section, Professor Norwood wrote “[n]one of those circumstances
apply here,”146 meaning that, according to her, proceeds from municipal
courts should be remitted to the state under article IX, section 7. But Pro-
fessor Norwood’s dissent did not elaborate on why those circumstances
did not apply.147
Unpacking these constitutional provisions raises some interpretive
questions:
1. Are municipal ordinances “penal laws of the state”?
140. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Recalibrating the Scales of Municipal Court Justice in Missouri: A
Dissenter’s View, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 121, 160 (2016).
141. MO. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
142. Norwood, supra note 140, at 159.
143. Id. at 160.
144. See MO. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
145. MO. CONST. art. V, § 27(16).
146. Norwood, supra note 140, at 160.
147. Id.
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2. Under what circumstances do the terms of article V, section
27(16) apply?
3. To which fines are municipalities entitled?
To answer these questions, this Note considers the history and text
of these two provisions, as well as existing appellate authority. This Note
concludes that the argument Professor Norwood advanced in her dissent
is correct and aims to flesh it out more fully. Although the prevailing ap-
proach accepts that municipalities can constitutionally keep the pro-
ceeds of prosecuting ordinance violations,148 there are strong historical
and legal arguments for reading article IX, section 7 to prohibit the prac-
tice and for finding article V, section 27(16) largely inapplicable to pre-
sent-day municipal courts. This Note argues that the Missouri legisla-
ture could and should legislatively require towns to remit the proceeds of
fines to an education fund, which would maximize the reach of article
IX, section 7.
A. Are Municipal Ordinance Violations of “Penal Laws of the State” Whose
Proceeds Must be Remitted?
To interpret article IX, section 7 of the Missouri Constitution and its
historical predecessors, it is helpful to look at how state courts around
the country have construed analogous provisions in their constitutions,
some of which may have been modeled after the Missouri Constitution. 
In 1986, Professor David Lawrence of the University of North Carolina
wrote a historical account of such provisions in the North Carolina Law
Review. Lawrence wrote that the 1868 North Carolina Constitution likely
modeled its provision for remitting proceeds of penal laws to public ed-
ucation after the 1865 Missouri Constitution.149 He speculated that, be-
cause Republicans dominated both constitutional conventions, “perhaps
an informal network linked Republican party members in different
states.”150 As it happens, the analogous provision of the present-day
North Carolina Constitution is also codified at article IX, section 7.151
148. See generally City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183, 189–90 (discussing municipal
fine collection practices and legislative efforts to curtail and regulate those collections), abrogated by
City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764, 778 (Mo. 2019).
149. David M. Lawrence, Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures: An Historical and Comparative Analysis, 65
N.C.L. REV. 49, 57 (1986).
150. Id.
151. The North Carolina Constitution provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, all moneys, stocks, bonds, and
other property belonging to a county school fund, and the clear proceeds of all penalties
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Lawrence found that, as of his writing, twelve states had such provisions,
five states once had but repealed them, and another three states desig-
nate to education the proceeds of “escheats and forfeitures.”152
Versions of today’s article IX, section 7 have appeared in the Missouri
Constitution since 1865, and as a result, the Missouri Supreme Court has
a long history of trying to determine which funds it applies to.153 In 1878,
the court held in Barnett v. Atlantic & Pacific Railroad that a law providing
double damages to owners of livestock killed by railroads was penal, but
that it was not covered by the public education fund clause because it ad-
dressed a private wrong.154 The court also held that the legislature had the
power to define which proceeds went to the state.155 In State ex rel. Rodes
v. Warner, the court invalidated a law directing fines for criminal viola-
tions of conservation laws to a “game protection fund.”156 It stated that
penal laws that “are merely leveled at a violation of private rights” are not
covered, nor are qui tam actions,157 but that “where fines and penalties are
prescribed as a punishment for a violation of public rights . . . the dispo-
sition of such recovered fines or penalties comes within the constitu-
tional provision under consideration, and they may not be turned awry
and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal
laws of the State, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully
appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools.
(b) The General Assembly may place in a State fund the clear proceeds of all civil penalties,
forfeitures, and fines which are collected by State agencies and which belong to the public
schools pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Moneys in such State fund shall be
faithfully appropriated by the General Assembly, on a per pupil basis, to the counties, to
be used exclusively for maintaining free public schools.
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
152. Lawrence, supra note 149, at 51–52 n.20. “Twelve other states currently have comparable
provisions in their constitutions.” See IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 9; MO.
CONST. art. IX, § 7; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 4;
N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. XII,
§ 5; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 2 (amended 1982); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 5. “In addition, five states at one
time, but no longer, included a comparable provision in their constitutions.” See ARK. CONST., art.
IX, § 4 (1868); FLA. CONST., art. VIII, § 4 (1868); FLA. CONST., art. XII, § 9 (1885, amended 1926); IOWA
CONST., art. IX, § 4 (1846); IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 4 (1857, repealed 1974); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6
(1859, amended 1966); MISS. CONST., art. VIII, § 6 (1869). “Three states allocate to education the pro-
ceeds of ‘escheats and forfeitures.’” See OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 3; WASH.
CONST. art. IX, § 3.
153. The provision first appeared as MO. CONST., art. IX, § 5 (1865), and then as MO. CONST., art.
XI, § 8 (1875). See Gross v. Gentry Cnty., 8 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Mo. 1928); see also Lawrence, supra note
149, at 56 n.57.
154. Barnett v. Atl. & Pac. R.R. Co., 68 Mo. 56, 62–65 (1878).
155. Id. at 63–64.
156. State ex rel. Rodes v. Warner, 94 S.W. 962 (Mo. 1906).
157. Qui tam refers to “[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for
a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.” Qui Tam
Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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[sic] from the prescribed constitutional course.”158 The Rodes court also
speculated that it would be permissible for the legislature to “devote a
reasonable portion of recovered fines and penalties by way of incentive
or spur to officers in collecting them and enforcing the law” and the re-
maining part would be “clear proceeds” for the public school fund.159 But
elsewhere, the court has made clear that the public education fund pro-
vision constrains the legislature’s discretion. In Gross v. Gentry County,
the court stated that “[t]his provision is affirmative in its nature and di-
rect in its terms; it consists simply in a mandatory declaration as to the
disposition that is to be made of the public funds designated, and it is
self-executing.”160
In later cases, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that, for funds
to be covered by article IX, section 7, they must be collected pursuant to
a statutory enactment, although the enactment does not have to be crim-
inal per se. In New Franklin School District No. 28 v. Bates, the court held that
a fine assessed against an insurance company in a quo warranto action
was not covered because it was not assessed pursuant to any statute.161
The court stated, “[w]e hold that the words ‘penal laws of the state’ as
used in Sec. 7, art. IX of the present constitution refer to statutory enact-
ments fixing or providing for penalties, forfeitures and fines and for
their assessment and collection.”162 In Reorganized School District No. 7 v.
Douthit, the court applied article IX, section 7 to civil asset forfeiture
from criminal drug sales, reasoning that a bright line rule between civil
and criminal forfeitures would be overly formalist and would allow the
legislature to circumvent the constitution’s intent.163 Reviewing its prec-
edent, the court stated that “the cases consistently hold that sums paya-
ble to the state must go for school purposes, to the exclusion of other
public agencies.”164
This line of cases shows that the simple argument that municipal or-
dinances cannot be covered by article IX, section 7’s requirements be-
cause they are not strictly “penal laws of the state” is unavailing. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court prefers a penal purpose test to determine what is
covered by article IX, section 7 over a formalist approach, and it has ap-
plied the article to governmental actions that are not criminal
158. State ex rel. Rodes, 94 S.W. at 966.
159. Id.
160. Gross v. Gentry Cnty., 8 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Mo. 1928).
161. New Franklin Sch. Dist. No. 28, v. Bates, 225 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Mo. 1950). Quo warranto is
“[a] common-law writ used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held or a franchise
is claimed,” or “[a]n action by which the state seeks to revoke a corporation’s charter.” Quo Warranto,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
162. New Franklin Sch. Dist., 225 S.W.2d at 774.
163. Reorganized School Dist. No. 7 v. Douthit, 799 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Mo. 1990).
164. Id. at 593.
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prosecutions. Thus, it is insufficient to simply recite that municipal laws
are not state penal laws to prove that they are not covered by article IX,
section 7. However, these cases do not conclusively establish the inverse:
that municipal laws are covered by article IX, section 7.
For that proposition, reformers might look for persuasive authority
in other states with similar constitutional provisions. North Carolina
(which, as mentioned, modeled its public education penalties clause af-
ter Missouri’s),165 has well-developed precedent in this area. The North
Carolina Constitution of 1875 provides in article IX, section 5 that “the
clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures, and of all fines collected in
the several counties for any breach of the penal or military laws of the
state” will be designated for public education.166 In 1872, North Carolina
passed General Statutes Section 14-4, which made a violation of a local
ordinance a misdemeanor and allowed towns to impose additional civil
penalties.167 It was not until a hundred years later, in 1972, that the legis-
lature permitted towns to impose civil penalties in lieu of criminal
charges.168 Over that time, the Supreme Court of North Carolina changed
its doctrine on how revenues from ordinance violations should be
treated. The earlier approach, articulated in Board of Education of Vance
County v. Town of Henderson, was to draw a distinction between “fines” im-
posed for violations of the criminal law under § 14-4 and “penalties” im-
posed for violations of municipal ordinances.169 The former had to be re-
mitted to the state education fund, while the latter towns could keep.170
But in later years, North Carolina took a broader view of what mu-
nicipal revenues must be reserved for education, which could be instruc-
tive for Missouri. In 1980, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled in
Cauble v. City of Asheville (Cauble II) that penalties paid for overtime park-
ing had to be remitted to the education fund under article IX, section 7
of the current North Carolina Constitution because the Asheville ordi-
nances provided that any ordinance violation was a crime under § 14-4
unless otherwise specified.171 Although Cauble II reaffirmed Henderson, it
moved away from the fine/penalty distinction:
165. See Lawrence, supra note 149, at 57.
166. Comm’rs of Wake v. City of Raleigh, 88 N.C. 120, 122 (1883) (emphasis omitted).
167. Lawrence, supra note 149, at 77.
168. Id.
169. Bd. of Educ. of Vance Cnty. v. Town of Henderson, 36 S.E. 158, 158 (N.C. 1900). This dis-
tinction actually expanded the reach of N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 5 since the North Carolina Supreme
Court had previously not applied that clause to municipal ordinances at all. See Comm’rs of Wake, 88
N.C. 120.
170. Bd. of Educ. of Vance Cnty., 36 S.E. at 158; see also Lawrence, supra note 149, at 77.
171. Id. at 260.
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[D]efendant’s reading of the language used by the Henderson
Court to differentiate “fines” from “penalties” is unduly restric-
tive. The heart of that court’s distinction lies not in whether the
monies are denominated “fines” or “penalties.” Indeed, we have
often stated that the label attached to the money does not con-
trol. Neither does the heart of the distinction rest in whether
there has been an actual criminal prosecution resulting in a “sen-
tence pronounced by the court.” The crux of the distinction lies
in the nature of the offense committed, and not in the method
employed by the municipality to collect fines for commission of
the offense.172
Professor Lawrence argued that Cauble II was wrongly decided and that
the original meaning of article IX, section 7 was closer to what the dissent
argued: that fines were only covered by that section if they were collected
in a full criminal proceeding.173 Thus, municipal ordinance violation rev-
enues were generally outside the reach of the constitution. But since his
writing, later decisions have only expanded on the Cauble II reasoning.
In Shavitz v. City of High Point, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
expanded on this reasoning to order that penalties paid under a munici-
pal red-light camera ordinance, authorized by state law, had to be re-
served for the education fund under article IX, section 7.174 The court held
that, regardless of whether the red-light penalty was criminal or civil, the
proceeds had to be designated for education.175 The court reasoned that
the town was operating under state law, and under Cauble II, penal pur-
pose is the test.176 A contrary holding, the court warned, “would . . . per-
mit High Point to ‘circumvent the state constitution by setting up a local
[penalty program] pursuant to state-delegated authority, and thereby
develop a new revenue stream, while depriving the schools of funds di-
rected to them by article IX, section 7 of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion.’”177 The court found it significant that a police officer reviewed the
red-light camera footage and made the ultimate decision to write a cita-
tion.178 However, the City of High Point was allowed to keep up to 10% of
172. Id. (citations omitted).
173. Lawrence, supra note 149, at 79–80.
174. See Shavitz v. City of High Point, 630 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
175. Id. at 14 (“[T]he fact that the violation results in a civil penalty rather than a fine for an in-
fraction is irrelevant if we are to observe the Supreme Court’s admonition to consider “the nature of
the offense committed, and not . . . the method employed by the municipality to collect fines for com-
mission of the offense.” (quoting Cauble II, 271 S.E.2d at 260)).
176. Id. at 14–15. See also N.C. Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Moore, 614 S.E.2d 504, 517 (N.C. 2005) (quoting
Cauble II, 271 S.E.2d at 260).
177. Shavitz, 630 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting Donoho v. City of Asheville, 569 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. Ct. App
2002) (holding that penalties under local air pollution ordinances must be designated for education).
178. Id. at 15.
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the proceeds of the red-light program179 because the legislature defined
“clear proceeds” in article IX, section 7 as the full cost of the penalty mi-
nus the costs of collection, not to exceed 10%, which Shavitz upheld as
constitutional.180
The combination of in-state precedent eschewing legal formalism
about what counts as “penal laws of the state” and out-of-state persua-
sive authority applying that reasoning to local ordinances gives reform-
ers in Missouri a lot to work with. They can unite those lines of precedent
to argue that proceeds from municipal ordinance violations should be re-
mitted to the education fund under article IX, section 7 of the Missouri
Constitution. As described above, Missouri and other jurisdictions have
moved away from a formalistic criminal/civil distinction for under-
standing the phrase “penal laws” in favor of a more purposive test.181 Ap-
plying that principle in this context, municipal court ordinance violation
cases have penal elements, including pleas of guilty or not guilty and a
right to counsel if incarceration is a possible penalty.182
Still, reformers have huge hurdles to overcome. In arguing that
towns cannot keep the proceeds of their ordinance prosecutions, re-
formers would be claiming that a long-established practice in every town
in the state is unconstitutional. Moreover, reformers would have to di-
rectly challenge the constitutionality of sections 479.050 and 479.080 of
the Missouri Code, which state that fines from violations of municipal
ordinances heard by municipal judges or state circuit judges are to be
placed in the municipal treasury.183 And reformers would be arguing
against the most natural reading of “penal laws of the state” in article IX, 
section 7, i.e., that the provision only covers state criminal laws.
None of these problems is insurmountable, though. Municipalities
are creatures of the state and act pursuant to state law.184 As the Shavitz
court in North Carolina argued, towns cannot claim their authority from
state law but disclaim the obligations state law imposes.185 The Shavitz
court’s warning about towns granting themselves the power to create
179. Id. at 15–17; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-437 (2021).
180. Shavitz, 630 S.E.2d at 17.
181. See discussion supra pp. 124–25.
182. See MO. S. CT. R. 37.50 (right to counsel); MO. S. CT. R. 37.58 (pleas).
183. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 479.050–479.080.
184. See MO. CONST. art. VI, § 15 (allowing the legislature to provide for four classes of municipal
government); id. at § 19(a) (providing that charter townships “shall have all powers which the general
assembly of the state of Missouri has authority to confer upon any city, provided such powers are
consistent with the constitution of this state and are not limited or denied either by the charter so
adopted or by statute. Such a city shall, in addition to its home rule powers, have all powers con-
ferred by law.”).
185. Cf. Shavitz, 630 S.E.2d at 14–15 (discussing how the City of High Point derives the authority
to enact a red-light camera ordinance from state law, and that “money collected under the ordinance
serves to punish transgressions of both local and state penal laws.”).
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new revenue streams and to retain the proceeds of their law enforcement
presaged what transpired in Ferguson.186 In Missouri, state law specifi-
cally designates authority for towns to establish a uniform schedule of
penalties for traffic violations, known as a “violations bureau,”187 so re-
formers could argue that violations of local traffic laws are also violations
of state law, even if towns charge the offense under local rather than state
codes. But to argue against a widely-accepted practice, reformers would
likely need to do a significant amount of public education and constitu-
tional advocacy before they could bring a lawsuit that convinces the Mis-
souri Supreme Court to accept an alternative reading of article IX, sec-
tion 7.
Reformers could also lobby the legislature to amend section 479.080
of the Missouri Code and give statutory force to article IX, Section 7, alt-
hough that may be politically difficult. The Missouri legislature could de-
fine “penal laws of the state” to include municipal ordinances and stipu-
late that revenues from violations of those ordinances must be treated as
article IX, section 7 prescribes. The legislature could follow North Caro-
lina’s lead and allow towns to keep the actual cost of collection, not to
exceed 10% of the whole penalty.188 Such a compromise might allow
towns to game the system, but it could also make it easier for towns to
withstand the resulting losses in revenues and for legislators to with-
stand political opposition. It would also allow the public to challenge
towns’ assessments of actual costs as excessive or unjustified. Finally, al-
lowing towns to keep some monies to recoup their expenses could poten-
tially resolve another constitutional barrier, as discussed below.
B. In Which Circumstances Does Article V, Section 27(16) Apply?
If article IX, section 7 of the Missouri Constitution creates a default
rule requiring proceeds from fines to be placed in the state education
fund, then article V, section 27(16) might be thought of as an exception to
the rule, explicitly allowing towns to keep their ordinance revenues un-
der certain circumstances. Under which circumstances is the exception
triggered? Professor Norwood, taking the reformer position and seeking
to constrain article V, section 27(16) as much as possible, stated summar-
ily “[n]one of those circumstances apply here.”189 Reformers need to offer
some explanation as to why that is the case. Recall that the section pro-
vides:
186. Id. at 14.
187. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.050 (2016).
188. See discussion supra Part III.A.
189. Norwood, supra note 140, at 160.
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A municipal corporation with a population of under four hun-
dred thousand shall have the right to enforce its ordinances and
to conduct prosecutions before an associate circuit judge in the
absence of a municipal judge and in appellate courts under the
process authorized or provided by this article and shall receive
and retain any fines to which it may be entitled. All court costs
shall be paid to and deposited monthly in the state treasury.190
Applying the last antecedent rule, the best reading of this text holds
that “shall receive and retain any fines to which it may be entitled” mod-
ifies the clause that immediately precedes it; that is, the final clause only
applies in cases where a town is prosecuting its ordinances not in a town
court, but in a state circuit (i.e., trial) or appellate court.191 That is the pro-
reform reading, since it narrows the reach of the clause substantially.
Although towns may choose not to run a court and instead prosecute
their ordinance violations in state court,192 municipal courts hear a large
number of cases; in 2018, the state’s municipal courts disposed of 667,482
traffic cases and 192,342 non-traffic ordinance cases.193 A town seeking a
broad reading of article V, section 27(16) might argue that the final clause
modifies the entire section, meaning that “[a] municipal corporation
with a population of under four hundred thousand” is entitled to its fine
revenues wherever it tries its cases. Under the last antecedent rule, that
should be rejected.
There are also historical reasons why the provision should be read
narrowly. In 1940, Missouri adopted its vaunted “Missouri Plan” for non-
partisan judicial selection to combat machine politics in cities.194 In 1970,
voters extended the reform to St. Louis County, then to other counties
three years later, and in 1976, the constitution was amended to reflect
190. MO. CONST. art V, § 27(16).
191. The last antecedent rule is defined as “[a]n interpretive principle by which a court deter-
mines that qualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them
and not words or phrases more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the
spirit of the entire writing.” Rule of the Last Antecedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
192. MO. REV. STAT. § 479.040 (2016).
193. MO. CTS., MISSOURI JUDICIAL REPORT SUPPLEMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2018, TABLE 93, MUNICIPAL
CASES FILED, DISPOSED AND PENDING (2018), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=137388 [https://
perma.cc/2SY6-LWLT].
194. Under the Missouri Plan, also known as the merit selection or non-partisan selection plan,
a judicial selection commission creates a binding list of judicial candidates for a nominating author-
ity (i.e., the governor) to select from. The successful candidate is then placed on the ballot in a reten-
tion election, in which voters are asked if the judge should be retained or rejected. The plan origi-
nated in Missouri and is now used by more than thirty states. See Missouri Bar, The Missouri Plan – A
Model for the Nation, YOUTUBE (Aug. 27. 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoeXycc0lJk
[https://perma.cc/C9LH-WPB6].
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these changes.195 Section 27, entitled “Effective Date and Transition Pro-
visions,” was part of the 1976 amendments and implements the transi-
tion.196 The section abolishes municipal courts as stand-alone entities
and re-establishes them under the control of the state judiciary.197 This
creates a unified state judiciary.198 Thus, municipal courts are formally
the “municipal divisions” of the state circuit courts, even though they are
furnished by towns.199 Municipal divisions are part of the judicial depart-
ment, over which the Supreme Court has “general superintending con-
trol.”200
Section 27 also sets out special provisions for the City of St. Louis,
which had unique judicial arrangements prior to the Missouri Plan.201
During the transition, the legislature provided certain steps for towns of
less than 400,000 to take to reconstitute their courts in the new system,
but for larger towns, judges automatically carried over.202 Thus, section
27(16) may be understood as explaining how ordinance violations should
be heard in towns that failed to provide municipal judges after the tran-
sition.203
Professor Norwood is correct that section 27(16), when read in this
light, does not apply to towns that have established municipal courts. 
Thus, the question at issue is where the proceeds from those courts
should be directed. It seems incongruous that the only towns to lose rev-
enue under section 27(16) are those that implemented the transition, but
one could argue that towns that reconstituted their courts ceded author-
ity over the courts’ administration to the state, whereas towns that did
not reconstitute their courts retained full control of them.
Even taking the broader reading of article V, section 27(16), the pro-
vision does not guarantee a town the right to keep the revenues of any
and all fines, only those “to which it may be entitled.” Recently, in just a
few lines of text, the Missouri Supreme Court specified which fine reve-
nues a town is entitled to: those not directed to other entities by statute.
195. Nonpartisan Court Plan, MO. CTS., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=297 [https://
perma.cc/4UGM-KH8L] (last visited Oct. 27, 2020).
196. MO. CONST. art. V, § 27.
197. Id. at art. V, § 27(2)(d); see also City of Kansas City v. Fasenmeyer, 907 S.W.2d 195, 197–98
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
198. GREG CASEY & JUSTIN BUCKLEY DYER, A GUIDE TO THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION 126 (Peter Lesser
et al. eds., 1st ed. 2018); JERRY A. MOYER, INST. FOR CT. MGMT., COURT CONSOLIDATION IN MISSOURI,
WHERE ARE WE AFTER 20 YEARS? 10 (2001), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/16504/
court_consolidation_mo.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6FF-2TNJ].
199. See, e.g., Local Courts, MO. CTS., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=321 [https://
perma.cc/8B33-AX3B] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
200. MOYER, supra note 198, at 16–17.
201. CASEY & DYER, supra note 198, at 158.
202. See Fasenmeyer, 907 S.W.2d at 199; MO. REV. STAT. § 479.030(3) (2016).
203. Cf. Fasenmeyer, 907 S.W.2d at 199.
984 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:4
As mentioned above, in City of Normandy v. Greitens, the City of Nor-
mandy challenged the legislature’s imposition in S.B. 5 of a 12.5% cap on
the percentage of operating revenues that towns in St. Louis County
could derive from their courts; other towns were limited to 20%.204 The
City of Normandy succeeded in arguing that the 12.5% cap was an invalid
special law,205 though the court has since changed its special-law doc-
trine.206 Normandy also raised and lost on an alternative argument, and
that portion of City of Normandy has not been abrogated. The town argued
that it could not be required to remit to the state excess revenues in vio-
lation of S.B. 5 because municipalities are entitled to the proceeds of
their fines under article V, section 27(16). Here is the entirety of the
court’s discussion of that claim:
The State, however, contends the amount of fines, if any, that a
municipality is entitled to keep for ordinance violations is a func-
tion of statute, not the constitution. The constitution does not
define the phrase “to which it may be entitled” but, in essence,
leaves that to the General Assembly, which has plenary power to
enact statutes on any subject not prohibited by the state’s consti-
tution. While municipalities are entitled to impose and retain
fines pursuant to article V, section 27.16 of the Missouri Consti-
tution, that right is subject to statutory limitations as deter-
mined by the General Assembly. There is no conflict between the
statute and constitutional provision here.207
For reformers, this is powerful language, but it comes with some draw-
backs. Employing the broader reading of section 27(16), the court treats
that provision as though it applies in this case, because Normandy has a
municipal court. But one could say that the court only accepted that
proposition arguendo, to show that Normandy would not win even if sec-
tion 27(16) applied. On the other hand, the court gives wide latitude to the
legislature to define what revenues towns may retain.
Perhaps if the legislature were to pass the most far-reaching legisla-
tion possible and prohibit towns from keeping any revenue collected by
their courts, that law would contravene section 27(16) under this reading.
After all, the legislature’s discretion is not limitless. But recall North Car-
olina’s approach, in which the legislature stipulated that all the “clear
proceeds” of ordinance violations belonged to the education fund, less
204. See discussion supra pp. 116–17; City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183 (Mo. 2017),
abrogated by City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc’ns Grp., LLC, 592 S.W.3d 764, 778 (Mo. 2019).
205. City of Normandy, 518 S.W.3d at 197.
206. See City of Aurora, 592 S.W.3d 764.
207. City of Normandy, 518 S.W.3d at 202 (citations omitted).
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the actual costs of collection, up to 10%.208 The language in Normandy re-
garding section 27(16), and caselaw in Missouri dating back to 1906,209
suggests that such a law would be constitutional in Missouri, and that
the legislature could rationally decide that the only court revenues to
which a town is “entitled” are those that recover its actual costs of collec-
tion.210 That rule would go a long way toward changing Missouri munic-
ipal courts for the better; town courts would only be allowed to pay for
their marginal costs and would no longer be profit machines.
IV. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
This Note recommends a far-reaching new approach to resolving the
continuing problem of policing for profit in the St. Louis region and be-
yond by arguing for doctrinal and legislative change that prevents towns
from keeping the proceeds of their ordinance enforcement. This reform
would require entrepreneurial interpretation that would allow a court to
adopt a reading of the state constitution that is soundly-reasoned but de-
parts from longstanding practice. It would also require activism to make
political space for a court or a legislature to enact such a change. Those
asks are doable and worth pursuing. In the short term, however, it does
not appear that the political will for such a reform currently exists. In-
deed, there have been attempts to repeal even the modest legislative re-
sponse to the Ferguson uprising, S.B. 5.211
Defenders in the municipal courts and local activists should make
better use of the tools that existing reforms have given them. As de-
scribed above, S.B. 5 instated a process by which the State Auditor and
Director of Revenue, upon a finding that a town or other subdivision is
not complying with minimum standards for their courts, can initiate a
ballot question to disincorporate the town.212 Activists should be pressur-
ing state actors to scrutinize towns’ required audit reports, identify vio-
lators, and invoke the disincorporation provisions. Additionally, S.B. 572
created a process by which 25% of voters in a town can petition to hold a
disincorporation vote at will.213 Disincorporation would be a difficult and
drastic step, but with many small towns or villages in St. Louis County,
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-437 (2021).
209. State ex rel. Rodes v. Warner, 94 S.W. 962, 966 (Mo. 1906); see discussion supra pp. 124–25.
210. City of Normandy, 518 S.W.3d at 202.
211. See Josh House, Missouri Legislature Should Not Repeal Post-Ferguson Reforms, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/missouri-legislature-should-
not-repeal-post-ferguson-reforms/article_124ecc8d-3822-5a09-b7a4-811d28bdd2c9.html. [https://
perma.cc/XPL4-E84G].
212. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 479.360, 479.368 (2016); see discussion supra Part III.B.
213. MO. REV. STAT. § 77.700 (2016).
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canvassing for 25% of voters may not be as difficult as it seems.214 Fur-
thermore, the activism necessary to place a disincorporation vote on the
ballot alone could signal to the legislature and the Missouri Supreme
Court that there is demand for more aggressive reforms, even if the dis-
incorporation question does not pass. Activists can also draw from the
considerable research on fees and fines that has been done since Fergu-
son, including a recent study of four states that found that, on average,
it costs $0.41 to collect court revenues for every dollar brought in, making
fees and fines not just a regressive tax, but also a very inefficient way to
fund government.215
Activists should identify which towns are the worst offenders, run a
ballot petition campaign, and make the affirmative case to voters that
they would be better off receiving municipal services like courts and po-
lice from a larger entity like the county. Although some towns have been
voluntarily dissolving their courts or police and merging those functions
with neighboring towns or county government,216 the threat of total town
dissolution could spur recalcitrant municipal leaders to accelerate that
process. Once dissolution of some long-standing, notorious towns oc-
curs, the idea of making major structural change in Missouri local gov-
ernance will seem less far-fetched. Put another way, one response to the
Ferguson uprising could have been eliminating the Ferguson govern-
ment. Maybe that does not make sense for Ferguson itself, given its rel-
atively large population and the scrutiny it has already received, but the
option remains on the table. Activists can use the ballot initiative cam-
paign to tell the stories of the Fergusons that have not received national
attention but are just down the road, and to educate people that the law
does not require residents to tolerate abusive and predatory local gov-
ernments.
CONCLUSION
Six years after the Ferguson uprising, the worst excesses of the po-
licing for profit regime have been abated, but so long as the profit motive
remains, the problem will persist. Existing reforms have nipped at the
edges of the problem, putting guardrails on how zealous towns can be in
extracting revenue from the poor via their courts, but they have not
214. See generally Population by Place in St. Louis County, STAT. ATLAS, https://statisticalatlas.com/
county/Missouri/St-Louis-County/Population#figure/place/total-population [https://perma.cc/775M-
B3ZQ] (last updated Sept. 4, 2018) (listing as many as fifty towns, villages, subdivisions, or other
places with populations of less than 5,000).
215. Menendez et al., supra note 22.
216. Bogan, supra note 29 (“Statewide, 69 municipalities have transferred their court operations
to circuit court, while others have restructured or consolidated.”).
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struck at the heart of the problem. The entities doing the law enforce-
ment (police, judges, town executive officers) need to be separated from
the entities receiving the proceeds of that enforcement (police, judges,
town executive officers). This Note offers ambitious legal reforms to
break those incentive structures and create that separation, either by
doctrinal change in the courts or statutory change in the legislature. In
the interim, this Note offers a roadmap for using existing law to arrive at
those ends. For those invested in the work of criminal justice reform, the
name Ferguson is now synonymous with a particular type of predatory
policing, but broad recognition of the problem across the civil rights
community has not yet galvanized sufficient reforms. We have to finish
the work of legal change that the people of Ferguson demanded and keep
the problem in the policy foreground. If we let it to fade into the back-
ground, Ferguson could also become a symbol of an incomplete legal re-
form movement that never achieved its stated goals, and a missed op-
portunity when conditions were ripe for change.

